OVERSIGHT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each committee report to contain a summary of the oversight findings and recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on Rules has received no such findings or recommendations from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

VIEWS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Clause 2(l)(5) of rule XI requires each committee to afford a two day opportunity for members of the committee to file additional, minority, or dissenting views and to include the views in its report. Although this requirement does not apply to the Committee, the Committee always makes the maximum effort to provide its members with such an opportunity. The following views were submitted:

MINORITY VIEWS

Numerous allegations have appeared in the press recently that licensing the launch of U.S. commercial satellites by China resulted in a transfer of technology that threatens U.S. security and that campaign contributions played a role in the issuance of such licensing. We agree that these allegations are serious and should be adequately investigated. However, we are not convinced that a select committee should be the response. If we find that the House has the ability through its normal committee structure to carry out any investigation necessary, a select committee seems wasteful and duplicative. In fact, at least four of the committees with jurisdiction in this matter are presently conducting their own investigations.

In drafting a resolution to establish the Select Committee, the Majority chose the Iran-Contra Select Committee as a model for this Select Committee. This particular model bestows extraordinary powers on the Chairman of the Select Committee. We are hopeful that the manner in which the Select Committee conducts its business will also follow the Iran-Contra model. The Iran-Contra Committee under the bipartisan leadership of Chairman Lee Hamilton and Ranking Republican Richard Cheney, along with their Senate counterparts Senators Daniel Inouye and Warren Rudman, made decisions jointly on all matters of procedural issues. In fact, Representative Hamilton stated in a letter to Representative Henry Waxman, dated June 16, 1997, that `I do not recall a single instance in which the majority acted unilaterally.' It is our belief that if a committee does not conduct itself in a professional, fair, and bipartisan manner, then its findings, no matter how earth-shattering, are tainted and damaged. It is for that reason that we hope that this committee will conduct its proceedings in the most serious bipartisan manner.

Even though we approach the establishment of the Select Committee with the hope that fair-mindedness will prevail, we find it difficult to support establishing the Select Committee without assurances that the minority will be included on an equal footing in the decision making process. The Rules Committee report states that the resolution has been `drafted to conform with the standing rules of the House.' This is not a fair statement. The resolution grants extraordinary authority to the chairman of the Select Committee which, in fact, weakens the rights of the minority and of witnesses. Our fears of abuse of this power are not groundless. One need look no further than the recent campaign finance investigations conducted by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight. Chairman Burton's conduct during that investigation demonstrated the dangers of granting such unilateral powers with no limitations. Chairman Burton gave the members of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, as well as the Rules Committee, assurances that he would not abuse the unilateral authorities granted by the Committee and by the House. In spite of these assurances, the Burton investigation is filled with examples of abuses of the extraordinary grant given him. As the Burton investigation has proven, the investigation has proven, the process only works if the chairman does not abuse his power and seeks to include the minority.

Throughout the hearing and mark-up process we were constantly told by the majority, including the designated chairman of the Select Committee, Representative Cox, that every effort would be made to guarantee the rights of the minority in the investigative process and to include the minority in all aspects of the investigation. We hope the chairman and ranking minority member will have a good working relationship. It is our responsibility, as the Committee on Rules, to make sure the rules of the Select Committee are fair. However, our concern, based on experience in this Congress, is that these rules will permit abuses by the majority party, if that party chooses that route. We have many reservations about this process and will explain below why we remain uneasy with the resolution.

There are a number of unilateral authorities granted to the chairman of the Select Committee by this resolution that cause us concern. The most important concerns are the provisions of section 9(b) of the resolution which grant the chairman, `upon consultation with the ranking minority member,' the authority to authorize and issue subpoenas. This unilateral subpoena authority is problematic in that merely requiring the chairman to consult with the ranking minority member before authorizing or issuing subpoenas does not require the chairman to include the minority in the investigative process. At the Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Chairman Burton unilaterally issued over 1000 information requests, including subpoenas, depositions, and document requests with neither a vote of the committee nor the concurrence of the ranking minority member. Our hopes are that this kind of abuse of power does not occur in the Select Committee.

The resolution also allows the chairman, after consulting with the ranking minority member, to take depositions anywhere in the world and authorizes a variety of mechanisms to obtain international assistance in gathering information. This authority has been granted in other major congressional investigations, and we do not necessarily object to its inclusion in this resolution. We would add a note of caution, however. The most recent example of the use of this authority was by the Government Reform Committee. As stated earlier, that investigation has been marked by partisanship, harassment of witnesses, misrepresentation and misleading statements, information leaks by staff, and disregard for the right of the minority to participate in this process. This does not instill confidence that international working relationships can be achieved. The ability to gain access to and information from foreign sources depends almost totally upon the willingness of the host country to allow it. This requires comity and clarity. We urge the Committee to engage in the kind of cooperative, bipartisan working arrangements which have enabled other congressional investigations to succeed.

Section 10 of the resolution grants the Select Committee the authority to receive and examine any tax return related to individuals and entities named by the Select Committee as possible participants, beneficiaries, or intermediaries in the transactions

under investigation. Virtually unfettered access to the tax records of individuals and others is a very risky venture and must be pursued with the utmost responsibility and respect for the privacy of those individuals. We urge the Select Committee to use the greatest of care in exercising this authority. We support the inclusion of language in the report that directs the Select Committee to vote to obtain these records.

Section 11 of the resolution grants the chairman the authority to impose a `gag rule' on individuals associated with the investigation, including witnesses and their attorneys. The numerous abuses of witnesses before the Government Reform Committee are well documented. It is extremely perilous to allow staff, in a closed session, to have virtually unlimited questioning of a witness with little or no rights given to the individual being deposed. There is ample opportunity for staff to intimidate and harass witnesses. These interrogatory sessions are not trials or courts of law and do not afford the same protections. If individuals giving depositions are deprived of the protections that are generally available to those giving statements under oath and are treated unfairly, these individuals, along with their counsels, would be prevented by these `gag rules' from coming forward to report such abuses or other inappropriate actions taken by the Select Committee or its staff. This is a troubling provision, and we urge the Select Committee to use this power in only the most judicious fashion.

Section 12 of the resolution states that `the Select Committee may submit to any standing committee specific matters within its jurisdiction and may request that such committees pursue such matters further.' This language is not clear in its intent. We believe that any jurisdictional referral by the Select Committee of its recommendations should be based on the jurisdiction of the standing committees as stated in the Rules of the House. The jurisdiction of the Select Committee is a temporary grant of authority by the House and should not prejudice the jurisdictions of the standing committees. Therefore in the interest of the precedents of the House, referrals should be based on the jurisdictions of the standing committees.

Section 14 authorizes $2.5 million for the Select Committee to conduct an investigation which will last no longer than 6 months. There are only three standing committees of the House that are expected to spend more over the next 6 months. At this rate of spending, this will become the most expensive select committee in the history of the House. Our hope is that this will not be a waste of taxpayers' money to duplicate much of the investigation already being carried on by other committees of the House.

It is our hope that as the Select Committee develops and adopts its rules, it will do so in a manner that protects minority rights. We urge the Select Committee to include in its rules provisions to provide for concurrence and advance notice to the minority when issuing subpoenas, scheduling witness interviews, and authorizing travel of staff inside and outside the U.S. to conduct those interviews. Also, we believe that any database which the Select Committee may develop itself or any databases which it may receive from other standing committees under section 8 of this resolution be shared with the minority.

We clearly recognize and fully support the right of Congress through its committee structure to conduct investigations and we recognize there are serious issues to be investigated. We are including with these views: an article by current National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on June 3, 1998; an article by Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley which appeared in the New York Times on June 5, 1998; an article by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter of the Forum for International Policy which appeared in the Washington Times on June 5, 1998; an article by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on June 7, 1998; and a document created by the National Security Council with input and clearance from the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We believe that these articles and document which address the core issues will clear up some of the confusion surrounding allegations reported in the press.

In conclusion, we have reservations about the resolution and we believe that the Select Committee may be redundant in light of other ongoing investigations. In fact, the investigation could be properly carried out by an existing committee, most likely the Intelligence Committee which has at its disposal all the necessary powers and expertise to conduct this investigation. But if the majority insists on having a select committee, we hope that its investigations will be done in the fairest, most bipartisan manner possible. Anything less will cast doubt on the integrity of the investigation.

Finally, there is a real danger that this type of resolution is now becoming a routine tool to circumvent the traditional committee process. It should be used rarely, only when warranted by extraordinary circumstances. The regular hearing route coupled with informal staff interviews should always be the preferred means for conducting investigations, as it is for the other standing committees of the House. We should not be in the habit of making this type of resolution a routine occurrence.
JOE MOAKLEY.
TONY P. HALL.
MARTIN FROST.
LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER.