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The amendments (No. 2997), as modified, and (No. 3017), as modified, are as follows:
AMENDMENT NO. 2997, AS MODIFIED
At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1535. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FEDERALISM IN IRAQ.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Iraq continues to experience a self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence.
(2) The ongoing sectarian violence presents a threat to regional and world peace, and the longterm security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that is stable, not a haven for terrorists, and not a threat to its neighbors.
(3) A central focus of al Qaeda in Iraq has been to turn sectarian divisions in Iraq into sectarian violence through a concentrated series of attacks, the most significant being the destruction of the Golden Dome of the Shia al-Askariyah Mosque in Samarra in February 2006.
(4) Iraqis must reach a comprehensive and sustainable political settlement in order to achieve stability, and the failure of the Iraqis to reach such a settlement is a primary cause of violence in Iraq.
(5) Article One of the Constitution of Iraq declares Iraq to be a ``single, independent federal state''.
(6) Section Five of the Constitution of Iraq declares that the ``federal system in the Republic of Iraq is made up of a decentralized capital, regions, and governorates, and local administrations'' and enumerates the expansive powers of regions and the limited powers of the central government and establishes the mechanisms for the creation of new federal regions.
(7) The federal system created by the Constitution of Iraq would give Iraqis local control over their police and certain laws, including those related to employment, education, religion, and marriage.
(8) The Constitution of Iraq recognizes the administrative role of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 3 northern Iraqi provinces, known also as the Kurdistan Region.
(9) The Kurdistan region, recognized by the Constitution of Iraq, is largely stable and peaceful.
(10) The Iraqi Parliament approved a federalism law on October 11th, 2006, which establishes procedures for the creation of new federal regions and will go into effect 18 months after approval.
(11) Iraqis recognize Baghdad as the capital of Iraq, and the Constitution of Iraq stipulates that Baghdad may not merge with any federal region.
(12) Despite their differences, Iraq's sectarian and ethnic groups support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
(13) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated on November 27, 2006, ``[t]he crisis is political, and the ones who can stop the cycle of aggravation and bloodletting of innocents are the politicians''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United States should actively support a political settlement in Iraq based on the final provisions of the Constitution of Iraq that create a federal system of government and allow for the creation of federal regions, consistent with the wishes of the Iraqi people and their elected leaders;
(2) the active support referred to in paragraph (1) should include--
(A) calling on the international community, including countries with troops in Iraq, the permanent 5 members of the United Nations Security Council, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and Iraq's neighbors--
(i) to support an Iraqi political settlement based on federalism;
(ii) to acknowledge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq; and
(iii) to fulfill commitments for the urgent delivery of significant assistance and debt relief to Iraq, especially those made by the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council;
(B) further calling on Iraq's neighbors to pledge not to intervene in or destabilize Iraq and to agree to related verification mechanisms; and
(C) convening a conference for Iraqis to reach an agreement on a comprehensive political settlement based on the federalism law approved by the Iraqi Parliament on October 11, 2006;
(3) the United States should urge the Government of Iraq to quickly agree upon and implement a law providing for the equitable distribution of oil revenues, which is a critical component of a comprehensive political settlement based upon federalism;
(4) the steps described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) could lead to an Iraq that is stable, not a haven for terrorists, and not a threat to its neighbors; and
(5) nothing in this Act should be construed in any way to infringe on the sovereign rights of the nation of Iraq.
At the end of subtitle C of title XV, add the following:
SEC. 1535. SENSE OF SENATE ON IRAN.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) General David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``[i]t is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps Qods Force, seeks to turn the Shi'a militia extremists into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq''.
(2) Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, stated in testimony before a joint session of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on September 10, 2007, that ``Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi state''.
(3) The most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, published in August 2007, states that ``Iran has been intensifying aspects of its lethal support for select groups of Iraqi Shia militants, particularly the JAM [Jays al-Mahdi], since at least the beginning of 2006. Explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks have risen dramatically''.
(4) The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, released on September 6, 2007, states that ``[t]he Commission concludes that the evidence of Iran's increasing activism in the southeastern part of the country, including Basra and Diyala provinces, is compelling. . . It is an accepted fact that most of the sophisticated weapons being used to `defeat' our armor protection comes across the border from Iran with relative impunity''.
(5) General (Ret.) James Jones, chairman of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, stated in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 6, 2007, that ``[w]e judge that the goings-on across the Iranian border in particular are of extreme severity
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(6) General Petraeus said of Iranian support for extremist activity in Iraq on April 26, 2007, that ``[w]e know that it goes as high as [Brig. Gen. Qassem] Suleimani, who is the head of the Qods Force . . . We believe that he works directly for the supreme leader of the country''.
(7) Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the president of Iran, stated on August 28, 2007, with respect to the United States presence in Iraq, that ``[t]he political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly. Soon we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course we are prepared to fill the gap''.
(8) Ambassador Crocker testified to Congress, with respect to President Ahmedinejad's statement, on September 11, 2007, that ``[t]he Iranian involvement in Iraq--its support for extremist militias, training, connections to Lebanese Hezbollah, provision of munitions that are used against our force as well as the Iraqis--are all, in my view, a pretty clear demonstration that Ahmedinejad means what he says, and is already trying to implement it to the best of his ability''.
(9) General Petraeus stated on September 12, 2007, with respect to evidence of the complicity of Iran in the murder of members of the Armed Forces of the United States in Iraq, that ``[t]e evidence is very, very clear. We captured it when we captured Qais Khazali, the Lebanese Hezbollah deputy commander, and others, and it's in black and white . . . We interrogated these individuals. We have on tape ..... Qais Khazali himself. When asked, could you have done what you have done without Iranian support, he literally throws up his hands and laughs and says, of course not . . . So they told us about the amounts of money that they have received. They told us about the training that they received. They told us about the ammunition and sophisticated weaponry and all of that that they received''.
(10) General Petraeus further stated on September 14, 2007, that ``[w]hat we have got is evidence. This is not intelligence. This is evidence, off computers that we captured, documents and so forth . . . In one case, a 22-page document that lays out the planning, reconnaissance, rehearsal, conduct, and aftermath of the operation conducted that resulted in the death of five of our soldiers in Karbala back in January''.
(11) The Department of Defense report to Congress entitled ``Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq'' and released on September 18, 2007, consistent with section 9010 of Public Law 109-289, states that ``[t]here has been no decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi'a militias in Iraq that attack Iraqi and Coalition forces and civilians . . . Tehran's support for these groups is one of the greatest impediments to progress on reconciliation''.
(12) The Department of Defense report further states, with respect to Iranian support for Shi'a extremist groups in Iraq, that ``[m]ost of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups are provided by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force . . . For the period of June through the end of August, [explosively formed penetrator] events are projected to rise by 39 percent over the period of March through May''.
(13) Since May 2007, Ambassador Crocker has held three rounds of talks in Baghdad on Iraq security with representatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(14) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 10, 2007, with respect to these talks, stating that ``I laid out the concerns we had over Iranian activity that was damaging to Iraq's security, but found no readiness on Iranians' side at all to engage seriously on these issues. The impression I came with after a couple rounds is that the Iranians were interested simply in the appearance of discussions, of being seen to be at the table with the U.S. as an arbiter of Iraq's present and future, rather than actually doing serious business . . . Right now, I haven't seen any sign of earnest or seriousness on the Iranian side''.
(15) Ambassador Crocker testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, stating that ``[w]e have seen nothing on the ground that would suggest that the Iranians are altering what they're doing in support of extremist elements that are going after our forces as well as the Iraqis''.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) that the manner in which the United States transitions and structures its military presence in Iraq will have critical long-term consequences for the future of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, in particular with regard to the capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to pose a threat to the security of the region, the prospects for democracy for the people of the region, and the health of the global economy;
(2) that it is a critical national interest of the United States to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from turning Shi'a militia extremists in Iraq into a Hezbollah-like force that could serve its interests inside Iraq, including by overwhelming, subverting, or co-opting institutions of the legitimate Government of Iraq;
(3) that the United States should designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and place the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps on the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, as established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and initiated under Executive Order 13224; and
(4) that the Department of the Treasury should act with all possible expediency to complete the listing of those entities targeted under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747 adopted unanimously on December 23, 2006 and March 24, 2007, respectively.
Insert prior to section (6) the following:
(16) Ambassador Crocker further testified before Congress on September 11, 2007, with respect to talks with Iran, that ``I think that it's an option that we want to preserve. Our first couple of rounds did not produce anything. I don't think that we should either, therefore, be in a big hurry to have another round, nor do I think we should say we're not going to talk anymore . . . I do believe it's important to keep the option for further discussion on the table.''
(17) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on September 16, 2007 that ``I think that the administration believes at this point that continuing to try and deal with the Iranian threat, the Iranian challenge, through diplomatic and economic means is by far the preferable approach. That's the one we are using . . . we always say all options are on the table, but clearly, the diplomatic and economic approach is the one that we are pursuing.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 minutes of debate equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees on the Biden amendment.
Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Senator Biden will control the time.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield back my time.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMISSION
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have discussed with the Senator from Delaware modifying his amendment expressing the sense of Congress on Federalism in Iraq.
My concern with the wording of the amendment stems from the fact that the Iraqi Sunnis did not participate fully in the drafting of the constitution of Iraq and the Sunni community voted overwhelmingly against it but were unable to prevent its adoption in a referendum. As a result of their dissatisfaction with the constitution, an agreement was made to convene a Constitutional Review Commission to review the constitution and to make recommendations for changes to the Iraqi Council of Representatives for submission to the Iraqi people. One of the benchmarks that the Iraqi political leaders agreed among themselves called for the Constitutional Review Commission to be formed by September 2006; for the Commission to complete its work by January 2007; and for a constitutional amendments referendum to be held, if required, in March 2007.
The Constitutional Review Commission has not completed its work despite several extensions of time; the most recent extension being until the end of this year. In recognition of the agreement to have a Constitutional Review Committee, the legislation establishing procedures for the creation of new federal regions in Iraq will not go into effect until 18 months after enactment of the legislation, which is April 2008.
Accordingly, I appreciate the modifications that Senator BIDEN is making to his amendment to reflect that the political settlement regarding federalism referred to in his amendment should be based upon the ``final'' provisions of the Iraq constitution. This will allow for the possibility of changes being made as a result of the work of the Constitutional Review Commission. I also appreciate Senator Biden's modifying the amendment to note that whatever the political settlement is, be it pursuant to the current or revised constitutional provisions, it should be based on the ``wishes of the Iraqi people and their elected leaders'' as we don't want to suggest that we are trying to impose anything on the Iraqis.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleague from Michigan for his suggestions. I believe that federalism and the creation of federal regions would be in the best interest of the Iraqi people and holds great promise for a political settlement among the Iraqi political leadership. I know that my friend is particularly concerned about the opposition of the Sunni community to the constitution. I agree with him that, at, the time of
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Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am checking to see if there is anybody on our side who wishes to speak for any amount of time.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on agreeing to the Biden amendment, as amended.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There appears to be a sufficient second.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. OBAMA) is necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Arizona (Mr. MCCAIN).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 75, nays 23, as follows:
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Brownback
Byrd
Cantwell
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Chambliss
Clinton
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Feinstein
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Hutchison
Inouye
Isakson
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Martinez
McCaskill
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Sanders
Schumer
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Tester
Warner
Webb
Whitehouse
Wyden
Alexander
Allard
Barrasso
Bond
Bunning
Burr
Coburn
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Enzi
Feingold
Graham
Hagel
Inhofe
Kyl
Sessions
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
McCain
Obama
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 75, the nays are 23. Under the previous order, requiring 60 votes for the adoption of the amendment, the amendment is agreed to.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
AMENDMENT NO. 3017
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be 2 minutes of debate, equally divided, prior to a vote in relation to amendment No. 3017, offered by the Senator from Arizona.
Who yields time?
The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, very briefly, this amendment is a sense of the Senate introduced by Senator Kyl and me. The findings document the evidence that shows that Iran, working through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has been training and equipping Iraqi extremists who are killing American soldiers--hundreds of them.
This sense of the Senate calls on the administration to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, allowing us to exert economic pressure on those terrorists who also do business and to stop them from killing Americans.
Because some of our colleagues thought paragraphs 3 and 4 of the sense of the Senate may have opened the door to some kind of military action against Iran, Senator Kyl and I have struck them from the amendment. That is not our intention. In fact, our intention is to increase the economic pressure on Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps so that we will never have to consider the use of the military to stop them from what they are doing to kill our soldiers.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will oppose the Kyl-Lieberman amendment for one simple reason: this administration cannot be trusted.
I am very concerned about the evidence that suggests that Iran is engaged in destabilizing activities inside Iraq. I believe that many of the steps the Senators from Connecticut and Arizona suggest be taken to end this activity can be taken today. We can and we should move to act against Iranian forces inside Iraq. We can and we should use economic pressure against those who aid and abet attacks on our forces and against Iraqis. The administration already has the authority to do these things and it should be doing them.
Arguably, if we had a different President who abided by the meaning and intent of laws we pass, I might support this amendment. I fear, however, that this President might use the designation of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity as a pretext to use force against Iran as he sees fit. While this may sound far-fetched to some, my colleagues should examine the record in two particular instances.
First, is the misuse of the authority that we granted the President in 2002 to back our diplomacy with the threat of force. My colleagues will remember that, at the time, we voted to give the President a strong hand to play at the U.N. to get the world to speak with one voice to Saddam: let the inspectors back in and disarm or be disarmed. We thought that would make war less likely.
But in the 5 months between our vote and the invasion of Iraq, the ideologues took over. The President went to war unnecessarily, without letting the weapons inspectors finish their work, without a real coalition, without enough troops, without the right equipment, and without a plan to secure the peace.
The second example is the administration's twisting of our vote on the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 as an endorsement of military action against Iraq. Let me quote the Vice President from November 2005:
Permit me to burden you with a bit more history: In August of 1998, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution urging President Clinton take `appropriate action' to compel Saddam to come into compliance with his obligations to the Security Council. Not a single senator voted no. Two months later, in October of '98--again, without a single dissenting vote in the United States Senate--the Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. It explicitly adopted as American policy supporting efforts to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power and promoting an Iraqi democracy in its place. And just two months after signing the Iraq Liberation law, President Clinton ordered that Iraq be bombed in an effort to destroy facilities that he believed were connected to Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs.
The Vice President made this argument despite this explicit section of the Iraq Liberation Act: ``Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the use of United States Armed Forces.''
These examples are relevant to the debate today.
The Authorization for the Use of Military Force approved in September 2001 would appear to limit the scope of authority it contains to the terrorists who conducted or aided the attacks of 9/11, or harbored them. But the President and his lawyers have frequently argued for a broad reading of this law,
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I do not think the suggestion that the President designate an arm of the government of Iran as a ``terrorist'' entity provides any authority to do anything. After all, it is a nonbinding measure. But this administration already has an unduly broad view of the scope of executive power, particularly in time of war. I do not want to give the President and his lawyers any argument that Congress has somehow authorized military actions. The lesson of the last several years is that we must be cautious about acting impulsively on legislation which can be misconstrued, and misused to justify actions that Congress did not contemplate.
With a different President who had a different track record, I could vote to support this amendment. But given this President's actions and misuse of authority, I cannot support the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WEBB. Mr. President, I have grave concerns about this amendment. I spoke at length on the floor yesterday about them. We have never characterized an entity of a foreign government as a foreign terrorist organization. If we are saying that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is conducting terrorist activities, what we are saying, in effect, is that the Revolutionary Guard is conducting military activities against us. This has the danger of becoming a de facto authorization for military force against Iran.
We have not had one hearing. I recommended yesterday that the amendment be withdrawn so we can consider it in the appropriate committees. I oppose passage at this time in the hope that we can get further discussion.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.
The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Mr. OBAMA) is necessarily absent.
Mr. LOTT. The following Senator is necessarily absent: the Senator from Arizona (Mr. MCCAIN).
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MENENDEZ). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 76, nays 22, as follows:
Akaka
Alexander
Allard
Barrasso
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burr
Cardin
Carper
Casey
Chambliss
Clinton
Coburn
Cochran
Coleman
Collins
Conrad
Corker
Cornyn
Craig
Crapo
DeMint
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Ensign
Enzi
Feinstein
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Hutchison
Inhofe
Isakson
Johnson
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Martinez
McConnell
Menendez
Mikulski
Murkowski
Murray
Nelson (FL)
Nelson (NE)
Pryor
Reed
Reid
Roberts
Rockefeller
Salazar
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith
Snowe
Specter
Stabenow
Stevens
Sununu
Thune
Vitter
Voinovich
Warner
Whitehouse
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Brown
Byrd
Cantwell
Dodd
Feingold
Hagel
Harkin
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Klobuchar
Leahy
Lincoln
Lugar
McCaskill
Sanders
Tester
Webb
Wyden
McCain
Obama
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On this vote, the yeas are 76, the nays are 22. Under the previous order requiring 60 votes for the adoption of this amendment, the amendment is agreed to.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.